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INDUSTRIAL POLICY REARS ITS UGLY HEAD
by Murray L. Weidenbaum
HIGHLIGHTS
o

0

"The willingness of government to bail out a Lockheed or Chrysler is
not surprising. That is the price that Congress is willing to pay to
avoid dealing with the underlying industrial problems that arise from
the existing pattern of governmental intervention in the private
economy." {p. 3}
"Some would attempt to stop economic change by dealing with the
so-called 'runaway plant problem' •••• This 'King Canute approach'
ignores the reasons why companies are forced to take such actions in
the first place. So frequently those plants have lost their
competitiveness due in large part to the government policies advocated
by the same groups that now support legislation against runaway
plants."

o

"There is a growth strategy that involves no expansion in either
government power or federal spending. Its elements are basic -- tax
simplification, regulatory relief, lower deficit financing, and
curtailed government lending ... {p. 5)

o

"The worst thing that we could do ••• is to shift from the much
maligned, ad hoc approach to a tidier and better planned system of
business bailouts. Say's Law -- supply creates its own demand -- would
work with a vengeance. The assured supply of assistance would create
more demands for aid." (p. 6}
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by Murray L. Weidenbaum
Remarks prepared for the Second Wharton/Reliance Symposium
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
May 3, 1983
As predictable as Spring crocuses, the high level of unemployment has led
to pleas for an
economy.

11

industrial policy 11 to restore the health of the American

By guiding investment into growth areas and out of declining

markets, a new federal industrial policy supposedly will restore the
competitiveness of American business at home and abroad.

But, as I tell my

students regularly, you often have to preserve the private enterprise system
from the contrary actions of individual entrepreneurs.
What is especially disconcerting is the number of business executives who
are joining in this chorus for more governmental intervention.

These are men

and women who normally champion private enterprise and oppose a bigger role
for Uncle Sam in business decision-making.
Shortcomings of Existing Industrial Policy
To begin with, it is important to realize that we already have many
government policies which affect industry in important ways -- and which have
in large measure contributed to the difficulties now being faced by the
American economy.

In the main, of course, these impacts are side-effects of

laws designed for other purposes.

There are many examples -- policies to

provide a more equitable tax structure, to reduce the inequality of the
Dr. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at
Washington University in St. Louis.
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distribution of income, to enhance the quality of life, to improve the
physical environment, and so forth.
Most of these policies ignore or at least take for granted the needs and
operations of the private enterprise system by focusing on non-economic and
social goals.

Intentionally or not, the result of these policies, in the

main, has tended to be in one direction --to weaken the basic condition of
the manufacturing sector of the economy.
This influence on the fundamental structure of American industry, as a
result of government policy, can readily be seen in the larger manufacturing
companies as they shift increasing portions of their work force away from the
creative and productive areas of business such as research and development,
manufacturing, and marketing.

This shift has resulted in an increase in the

overhead functions -- legal activities, accounting and finance, public
affairs, and government relations.

For the individual firm, this change may

be an essential way of responding to pressures from government agencies and
self-styled public interest groups with noneconomic orientations.

But the

impact on national productivity can only be negative.
Moreover, this change is compounded by the metamorphosis of the
traditional functions, such as the growing size of 11 defensive" research as a
major mission of industrial laboratories.

That refers to reorienting business

research efforts to please the regulators.
has become a new marketing function.

Similarly,

11

reverse distribution ..

That refers to gearing for and, on

occasion, carrying out product recalls.

The ultimate effects of these

responses to government dictates go far beyond the immediate compliance
expenses.

Often, they contribute to the problems which spur the current calls

for reindustrialization.
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By overlooking these structural responses to existing governmental
policy, all that is visible in the short run are the pleas for bailouts,
subsidies, and other special assistance from the companies that are most
severely affected by the governmental burdens imposed on American industry.
But, on reflection, the willingness of government to bail out a Lockheed or a
Chrysler is not surprising.

That is the price that Congress is willing to pay

to avoid dealing with the underlying industrial problems that arise from the
existing pattern of governmental intervention in the private economy.
Why Bring Back the RFC?
A focal point for the current advocates of industrial policy is the
proposed reestablishment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
take a detailed look at that idea.

Let us

As we may recall, that federal agency was

a creature of the Depression of the 1930s which grew rapidly during and
following World War II.

Those with short memories may think well of that

government enterprise .

But a review of its activities is instructive for

today•s situation.
Under the original act passed in 1932, Congress granted the RFC very
modest lending powers limited to railroads and financial institutions.

During

the next six years, however, the agency•s authority was steadily broadened.
By 1938, it had the power to buy the securities of any business enterprise.
The RFC had become an extensive corporate bail-out agency in the form of a
government-sponsored investment bank.

Attention is usually focused on the

contributions that the RFC made during the Depression and World War II.
Nevertheless, most of its loans to business were made in the postwar boom
period of the late 1940s and early 1950s.
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The statutory criteria for loan approvals were extremely vague.

As we

would expect, Congress stipulated that the RFC should extend loans only for
purposes that would serve the public interest.

By 1949, rumors circulated

that connections with influential people in Washington were often the real
basis for gaining loan approvals from the RFC.

Subsequently, Congressional

hearings disclosed numerous examples of favoritism and corruption in the
granting of RFC loans.

Finally, in 1953, Congress ended the life of what was

by then a discredited agency.
There is indeed much to learn from the operations of the RFC.
Its history shows that government subsidy of business encourages and
perpetuates a misallocation of resources.
11

The agency•s loans included such

high priority .. ventures as distillers, brewers, drive-in theaters, hotels,

motels, and bars.

The RFC experience also demonstrates once again that

government programs develop a life of their own and persist long after the
problems for which they were created have been solved.
Variations on the negative theme of focusing on the
limited to the notion of bringing back the RFC.
economic change by dealing with the so-called

11

11

losers 11 are not

Some would attempt to stop
runaway plant problem ...

Their

response is to make it extremely difficult and costly to move or close down an
industrial facility.

This

11

King Canute approach 11 ignores the reasons why

companies are forced to take such actions in the first place.

So frequently

those plants have lost their competitiveness due in large part to the
government policies advocated by the same groups that now support legislation
against runaway plants.

Such proposals also overlook the negative signals

that this policy would send out to any company considering building a new
plant in a region that has adopted restrictive legislation (and a few states
already have done so).
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Close cousins of this negative approach are proposals to

11

protect 11

various industries and markets from foreign competition and to inhibit
American investments overseas.

None of these approaches would lead to a more

productive or more competitive economy.

They often would shelter companies

and localities from their own mistakes.
A Positive Approach
All this, however, need not lead to a 11 do nothing 11 approach to the
serious economic questions that face the United States.

There is a growth

strategy that involves no expansion in either government power or federal
Its elements are basic --tax simplification, regulatory relief,

spending.

lower deficit financing, and curtailed government lending.

In each of these

areas, much needs to and can be done.
The 1981 tax reductions were surely welcome.

But the sad fact of the

matter is that the tax code is far more complicated today than it was just a
few years ago.

To any one who has ever tried to fill out the tax forms for a

small company, it is clear that simplification is not just a pleasant thought,
but a vitally important need.
Similarly, the regulatory relief effort has accomplished much in reducing
the burden of new rules.

But fundamental improvement can come only from

revising existing statutes that mandate unreasonable burdens of compliance,
such as the

11

Zero discharge" goal of the Clean Water Act and the

11

Zero risk"

provision of the Delaney Amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
Furthermore, it is ironic to contemplate the numerous industrial-policy
proposals for funneling federal funds to "worthy 11 private investment areas at
a time when the federal government is running budget deficits of $200 billion
a year.

The most effective way to increase private capital formation is just
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the reverse of the RFC approach; it is to reduce the federal drain on private
saving represented by massive deficit financing.
Finally, federal lending programs are a classic example of robbing Peter
to pay-- or lend to-- Paul.
saving.

They do nothing to increase the pool of private

But they do reduce the amount available in the private market.

The most effective strategy for encouraging economic growth is no secret.
It is to reduce government barriers and achieve a better functioning market
economy.
guarantee.

However, the approach I am advocating is not accompanied by any
In a truly dynamic, competitive economy, we do not know in advance

where the new product breakthroughs will occur.
evenly distributed.

And the benefits will not be

But we do know that society as a whole will be better

off, since it is likely that most --but not all

industrial workers and

employers will enjoy higher real incomes and living standards.

Surely the

positive types of industrial policy are designed to enhance productivity,
capital formation, and international competitiveness.

The negative approaches

are all adverse to these key economic goals.
Conclusion
The current discussion of industrial policy ignores the fundamental
contradictions that now abound in government policies affecting private
industry.

The worst thing that we could do, however, is to shift from the

much maligned, ad hoc approach to a tidier and better planned system of
business bailouts.

Say's Law -- supply creates its own demand -- would work

with a vengeance.

The assured supply of assistance would create more demands

for aid.

Companies would be more reluctant to make those difficult choices

needed to avoid pleas for government aid.

Unions would be reluctant to settle
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for less if the government ultimately validates pay increases beyond the
capacity of companies to pay.
Much of the current talk of a comprehensive industrial policy smacks of
national economic planning.

The rekindled interest in such an approach is due

to a simpleminded analogy with planning techniques in private business.
to talk about

11

But

Corporate planning .. and "government planning" in the same

breath disregards the fundamental distinction between members of a society
forecasting and reacting to the future, and the government of that society
trying to regulate or control it.

Corporate planning is necessarily based on

attempting to persuade consumers to buy a firm's goods or services.

In

striking contrast, the government is sovereign, and its planning ultimately
involves the use of its power to achieve the results it desires.
When we look at the operation of centralized economic planning adopted by
market-oriented, non-Communist nations, we find that these planning systems
have shifted the focus of private enterprise even further away from dealing
with market forces and consumer demands, toward reaching an accomodation with
an ever more powerful government bureaucracy.
Under an American version of centralized economic planning, a company
might find it desirable to shift resources from conventional marketing
activities to convincing the government to adopt more generous production
targets for its industry.

Thus, there might be less payoff from traditional

consumer market research than from new efforts to persuade the government to
treat the industry more favorably.

Such public sector "marketing" activities

would be a low priority use of business resources from the viewpoint of
society as a whole.

Yet, given the incentive of any organization to grow and

prosper in the environment it faces, this result would not be surprising under
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a system of strong national economic planning and centralized decision
making.
A cynic might conclude that the optimum amount of change in industrial
policy is zero.

That is, the positive approaches that I have advocated may

not be adopted and the negative approaches that involve further government
intervention may turn out to be more popular.

But I remain a patient

optimist, hoping that some modest contribution to a more productive and
competitive industrial structure will result from the renewed interest in
facing the nation•s economic problems.

